R (on the application of Solicitors Regulation Authority) v Imran [2015] EWHC 2572, Dove JThe Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) challenged the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's (SDT) decision not
R (on the application of Solicitors Regulation Authority) v Imran [2015] EWHC 2572, Dove J
The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) challenged the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's (SDT) decision not to strike off a solicitor following a conviction for perjury. Perhaps surprisingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the SDT had not erred in finding that there were exceptional circumstances, and the SDT's finding was carefully reasoned and explained.
The appellant dishonestly submitted false details to the police in relation to a speeding ticket. A police investigation followed and he was charged under Section 5A of the Perjury Act 1911 and sentenced to two months' imprisonment. He had been a trainee solicitor at the time of the offence but had qualified by the time he was charged.
The SDT brought proceedings against the appellant in relation to the perjury offence. The SDT acknowledged the severity of the misconduct and further acknowledged that a finding of dishonesty would almost invariably lead to striking off, save for in exceptional circumstances. The SDT considered the appellant's mitigating circumstances, including his immediate, frank and open admissions to the Police and the SDT, and his voluntary notification to the SRA. The appellant's role as the sole breadwinner for his family was also held to be significant, as was the strong support he had inspired from his employer. The panel felt the public would be inclined to empathise with the appellant's position. Regarding the appellant's conduct, the SDT found it to have been spontaneous, amounting only to 'a single episode of very brief duration'. The above, in hand with the appellant's lack of maturity at the time of the offence, caused the SDT to conclude that the appellant's case was indeed 'very particular and exceptional'. Accordingly, a two year suspension order was imposed.
On appeal, the SRA argued that there was no justification for the SDT to conclude that the appellant's dishonesty was spontaneous. The SRA contended that this conclusion had affected the SDT's assessment as to the seriousness of the appellant's conduct. The court acknowledged that the degree of culpability and the extent of the appellant's dishonesty were important, particularly in relation to protecting the reputation of the profession. However, the court noted that the SDT had heard not only submissions but also evidence on this point, which had enabled them to reach a finding that was carefully reasoned and explained. The court attached significance to the fact that the appellant's conduct was unplanned and occurred over a very short period of time.
The SRA further argued that the SDT had failed to appreciate the nature of the offence with which the appellant had been charged. Again, the court affirmed the SDT's approach, noting a specific reference to the appellant thwarting 'the administration of justice' in their conclusions.
Finally, the SRA argued that the SDT had relied on unexceptional factors to conclude that this was an exceptional case. In particular, the SRA drew the court's attention to the SDT's consideration of the appellant's mitigating circumstances. The SRA argued that many of these factors are commonplace. The court rejected this argument, noting that it is important to 'stand back' from the various factors considered in such cases and put first and foremost the particular conclusions that had been reached about the dishonesty itself. The court was satisfied that dishonesty had been placed 'at the heart' of the SDT's decision, not only as to the culpability of the appellant but also as to the effect of that dishonesty on the reputation of the profession. In particular, the court noted the SDT's view that the public would empathise with the appellant's position.
The court concluded that the SDT's findings in respect of dishonesty, alongside the mitigating factors raised by the appellant, made this an exceptional case. As such, citing Salsbury v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ, the court observed that it could certainly not conclude that the decision reached by the SDT was 'clearly inappropriate'. In addition, the court acknowledged the SDT's 'wide experience' of hearing similar cases and deferred to their expertise in recognising those infrequent cases in respect of which striking off was not an inevitable outcome. This case serves as a reminder of the High Court's duty to pay 'proper respect' to decisions reached by expert and informed bodies, and is another decision in an emerging line of cases which highlight that even serious dishonesty does not mean that striking off is inevitable.
The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) challenged the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's (SDT) decision not to strike off a solicitor following a conviction for perjury. Perhaps surprisingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the SDT had not erred in finding that there were exceptional circumstances, and the SDT's finding was carefully reasoned and explained.
The appellant dishonestly submitted false details to the police in relation to a speeding ticket. A police investigation followed and he was charged under Section 5A of the Perjury Act 1911 and sentenced to two months' imprisonment. He had been a trainee solicitor at the time of the offence but had qualified by the time he was charged.
The SDT brought proceedings against the appellant in relation to the perjury offence. The SDT acknowledged the severity of the misconduct and further acknowledged that a finding of dishonesty would almost invariably lead to striking off, save for in exceptional circumstances. The SDT considered the appellant's mitigating circumstances, including his immediate, frank and open admissions to the Police and the SDT, and his voluntary notification to the SRA. The appellant's role as the sole breadwinner for his family was also held to be significant, as was the strong support he had inspired from his employer. The panel felt the public would be inclined to empathise with the appellant's position. Regarding the appellant's conduct, the SDT found it to have been spontaneous, amounting only to 'a single episode of very brief duration'. The above, in hand with the appellant's lack of maturity at the time of the offence, caused the SDT to conclude that the appellant's case was indeed 'very particular and exceptional'. Accordingly, a two year suspension order was imposed.
On appeal, the SRA argued that there was no justification for the SDT to conclude that the appellant's dishonesty was spontaneous. The SRA contended that this conclusion had affected the SDT's assessment as to the seriousness of the appellant's conduct. The court acknowledged that the degree of culpability and the extent of the appellant's dishonesty were important, particularly in relation to protecting the reputation of the profession. However, the court noted that the SDT had heard not only submissions but also evidence on this point, which had enabled them to reach a finding that was carefully reasoned and explained. The court attached significance to the fact that the appellant's conduct was unplanned and occurred over a very short period of time.
The SRA further argued that the SDT had failed to appreciate the nature of the offence with which the appellant had been charged. Again, the court affirmed the SDT's approach, noting a specific reference to the appellant thwarting 'the administration of justice' in their conclusions.
Finally, the SRA argued that the SDT had relied on unexceptional factors to conclude that this was an exceptional case. In particular, the SRA drew the court's attention to the SDT's consideration of the appellant's mitigating circumstances. The SRA argued that many of these factors are commonplace. The court rejected this argument, noting that it is important to 'stand back' from the various factors considered in such cases and put first and foremost the particular conclusions that had been reached about the dishonesty itself. The court was satisfied that dishonesty had been placed 'at the heart' of the SDT's decision, not only as to the culpability of the appellant but also as to the effect of that dishonesty on the reputation of the profession. In particular, the court noted the SDT's view that the public would empathise with the appellant's position.
The court concluded that the SDT's findings in respect of dishonesty, alongside the mitigating factors raised by the appellant, made this an exceptional case. As such, citing Salsbury v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ, the court observed that it could certainly not conclude that the decision reached by the SDT was 'clearly inappropriate'. In addition, the court acknowledged the SDT's 'wide experience' of hearing similar cases and deferred to their expertise in recognising those infrequent cases in respect of which striking off was not an inevitable outcome. This case serves as a reminder of the High Court's duty to pay 'proper respect' to decisions reached by expert and informed bodies, and is another decision in an emerging line of cases which highlight that even serious dishonesty does not mean that striking off is inevitable.