M, a barrister, appealed against the decision of the SDT in his case, and in particular its decision, having declined to make a Section 43 Order (essentially an order vesting in the SRA the control of
M, a barrister, appealed against the decision of the SDT in his case, and in particular its decision, having declined to make a Section 43 Order (essentially an order vesting in the SRA the control of his future employment in a solicitor's practice) to refuse to award him his costs of the proceedings.
The SRA had sought an order against M on the basis that he had been running two solicitors firms without proper supervision; that he had transferred files and monies from one firm to another firm which was not recognised; and that he was a member of a firm of solicitors when this was not permitted.
Aside from those matters which had been admitted, the only findings made against M at the SDT were de minimis or technical in nature. The SDT recognised that M had always tried to act in the best interests of his client, and did not deem the findings sufficient to warrant a Section 43 Order. The SDT did not therefore make any order against M, but nor, applying Baxendale‑Walker v Law Society [2007] EWCA Civ 233, did it order the SRA to pay M's costs.
M appealed. Mr Justice Dingemans, in considering the appeal, noted that in Baxendale‑Walker v Law Society it was determined that that in the absence of dishonesty or bad faith, a costs order should not be made against a regulator unless there was a good reason to do so.
He found that, in M's case, the SDT had made full and appropriate reference to, and application of, Baxendale-Walker in applying the correct legal test. Further, following Law Society v Adcock [2006] EWHC 3212 Admin (which states that a court "should only disturb an order for costs in rare circumstances and only if, in the exercise of its discretion, the tribunal has misdirected itself or reached a conclusion which this court would not have reached, and where the solution preferred by the tribunal has exceeded the general ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible") Mr Justice Dingeman did not consider that the SDT had misdirected itself nor that it reached a conclusion which the High Court would not have done where that solution exceeded the general ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.
As a result, whilst he expressed sympathy for M's position, he dismissed the appeal.
The SRA had sought an order against M on the basis that he had been running two solicitors firms without proper supervision; that he had transferred files and monies from one firm to another firm which was not recognised; and that he was a member of a firm of solicitors when this was not permitted.
Aside from those matters which had been admitted, the only findings made against M at the SDT were de minimis or technical in nature. The SDT recognised that M had always tried to act in the best interests of his client, and did not deem the findings sufficient to warrant a Section 43 Order. The SDT did not therefore make any order against M, but nor, applying Baxendale‑Walker v Law Society [2007] EWCA Civ 233, did it order the SRA to pay M's costs.
M appealed. Mr Justice Dingemans, in considering the appeal, noted that in Baxendale‑Walker v Law Society it was determined that that in the absence of dishonesty or bad faith, a costs order should not be made against a regulator unless there was a good reason to do so.
He found that, in M's case, the SDT had made full and appropriate reference to, and application of, Baxendale-Walker in applying the correct legal test. Further, following Law Society v Adcock [2006] EWHC 3212 Admin (which states that a court "should only disturb an order for costs in rare circumstances and only if, in the exercise of its discretion, the tribunal has misdirected itself or reached a conclusion which this court would not have reached, and where the solution preferred by the tribunal has exceeded the general ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible") Mr Justice Dingeman did not consider that the SDT had misdirected itself nor that it reached a conclusion which the High Court would not have done where that solution exceeded the general ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.
As a result, whilst he expressed sympathy for M's position, he dismissed the appeal.