Dr Miller was a Consultant Psychiatrist who was the subject of GMC proceedings following allegations of financial impropriety concerning a former patient, Patient A. In these Judicial Review
Dr Miller was a Consultant Psychiatrist who was the subject of GMC proceedings following allegations of financial impropriety concerning a former patient, Patient A. In these Judicial Review proceedings, he challenged the decision of the GMC's Fitness to Practise Panel (FTPP) that the whole of the FTPP hearing should take place in private.
Patient A had asserted that he was not prepared to give evidence before the FTPP unless the whole hearing was conducted in private, and that he considered that anonymisation of his name, and the option of giving evidence from behind a screen, was insufficient protection. The FTPP concluded that the hearing should be held in private, as to refuse might result in Patient A not giving evidence at all.
Dr Miller challenged that decision, on the basis that the GMC had not adduced any evidence to demonstrate a sufficiently settled intention of Patient A not to give evidence unless the whole of the hearing was held in private, or indeed any evidence to show an objectively reasonable foundation for his position. He also submitted that the FTPP's decision had breached his right to a public hearing under Article 6. Â The detailed circumstances of the case do not appear in the case report to maintain Patient A's anonymity.
Judge Pelling QC considered R v. Legal Aid Board ex parte Kaim Todner [1998] EWCA Civ 958, in which the Court of Appeal set out the relevant principles where one party wished to depart from the general rule that a hearing should be held in public. In particular, he noted that the case highlighted that "a party cannot be allowed to achieve anonymity by insisting upon it…irrespective of whether the demand is reasonable. There must be some objective foundation for the claim which is being made."
Judge Pelling QC concluded that the FTPP's decision in Dr Miller's case had been tainted by error of law. In particular, the FTPP had failed to consider the importance of Article 6, with the onus being on the GMC to show that the derogation from Dr Miller's Article 6 rights was necessary and proportionate.
Further, Judge Pelling QC considered that the evidence for Patient A's settled intention not to give evidence in public had not been sufficiently explored, and thus there was no evidence from which the FTPP could properly have concluded that Patient A would not give evidence unless the hearing was in private hearing. The decision made by the FTPP directing that the substantive hearing of the case against Dr Miller be heard in private was therefore quashed.
Patient A had asserted that he was not prepared to give evidence before the FTPP unless the whole hearing was conducted in private, and that he considered that anonymisation of his name, and the option of giving evidence from behind a screen, was insufficient protection. The FTPP concluded that the hearing should be held in private, as to refuse might result in Patient A not giving evidence at all.
Dr Miller challenged that decision, on the basis that the GMC had not adduced any evidence to demonstrate a sufficiently settled intention of Patient A not to give evidence unless the whole of the hearing was held in private, or indeed any evidence to show an objectively reasonable foundation for his position. He also submitted that the FTPP's decision had breached his right to a public hearing under Article 6. Â The detailed circumstances of the case do not appear in the case report to maintain Patient A's anonymity.
Judge Pelling QC considered R v. Legal Aid Board ex parte Kaim Todner [1998] EWCA Civ 958, in which the Court of Appeal set out the relevant principles where one party wished to depart from the general rule that a hearing should be held in public. In particular, he noted that the case highlighted that "a party cannot be allowed to achieve anonymity by insisting upon it…irrespective of whether the demand is reasonable. There must be some objective foundation for the claim which is being made."
Judge Pelling QC concluded that the FTPP's decision in Dr Miller's case had been tainted by error of law. In particular, the FTPP had failed to consider the importance of Article 6, with the onus being on the GMC to show that the derogation from Dr Miller's Article 6 rights was necessary and proportionate.
Further, Judge Pelling QC considered that the evidence for Patient A's settled intention not to give evidence in public had not been sufficiently explored, and thus there was no evidence from which the FTPP could properly have concluded that Patient A would not give evidence unless the hearing was in private hearing. The decision made by the FTPP directing that the substantive hearing of the case against Dr Miller be heard in private was therefore quashed.