Daniels v NMC [2014] EWHC 3287, Davies JThis case provides a useful example of the threshold the High Court will apply when considering whether circumstances are sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant
Daniels v NMC [2014] EWHC 3287, Davies J
This case provides a useful example of the threshold the High Court will apply when considering whether circumstances are sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant an extension to the time limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary tribunal.
Ms Daniels was given a three year caution order by the Nursing and Midwifery Council ("the NMC"). By the time she received notice of this sanction, she had been unemployed for three years and was living on benefits, and therefore encountered difficulties in funding her legal representation. She wished to lodge an appeal against the sanction, but was unable to secure sufficient funds to pay the £235 court fee before the deadline, which fell on a Friday. She was finally able to gather sufficient funds the following Tuesday, when the fee was paid and the grounds of appeal were lodged. It fell upon Davies J to decide whether to grant an extension of the time to appeal.
Davies J considered R (Adesina) v NMC [2013] EWCA (Civ) 818, which itself followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Pomiechowski v Poland [2012] 1 WLR 1604. Pomiechowski established that a discretion to extend time limits could arise in 'exceptional circumstances' and if the appellant had personally done all they could to lodge the appeal on time. In Adesina, Kay LJ used hypothetical situations to illustrate circumstances which would be considered 'exceptional', for example where an appellant is unable to lodge an appeal on time due to serious illness, or due to notice of a disciplinary decision never reaching them. He considered that interpreting the statutory time limit in absolute terms in such circumstances would be to 'allow the time limit to impair the very essence of the statutory right of appeal'.
Davies J ruled that in the present case there was a good reason why Ms Daniels was unable to lodge the appeal on time, namely that she was unable to secure £235 in order to pay the court fee, due to her difficult financial circumstances. Davies J also took note of the fact that the time by which Ms Daniels was outside the 28 day deadline was short, and that the NMC did not suffer any particular prejudice as a result of the delay. She was satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed, and therefore granted an extension of the time to appeal.
This case provides a useful illustration of how in very limited circumstances the courts can be prepared to depart from rigid adherence to statutory provisions, in order not to undermine the essence of the right of appeal. It will be interesting to see how the courts deal with the issue in the future when confronted with different factual scenarios.
This case provides a useful example of the threshold the High Court will apply when considering whether circumstances are sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant an extension to the time limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary tribunal.
Ms Daniels was given a three year caution order by the Nursing and Midwifery Council ("the NMC"). By the time she received notice of this sanction, she had been unemployed for three years and was living on benefits, and therefore encountered difficulties in funding her legal representation. She wished to lodge an appeal against the sanction, but was unable to secure sufficient funds to pay the £235 court fee before the deadline, which fell on a Friday. She was finally able to gather sufficient funds the following Tuesday, when the fee was paid and the grounds of appeal were lodged. It fell upon Davies J to decide whether to grant an extension of the time to appeal.
Davies J considered R (Adesina) v NMC [2013] EWCA (Civ) 818, which itself followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Pomiechowski v Poland [2012] 1 WLR 1604. Pomiechowski established that a discretion to extend time limits could arise in 'exceptional circumstances' and if the appellant had personally done all they could to lodge the appeal on time. In Adesina, Kay LJ used hypothetical situations to illustrate circumstances which would be considered 'exceptional', for example where an appellant is unable to lodge an appeal on time due to serious illness, or due to notice of a disciplinary decision never reaching them. He considered that interpreting the statutory time limit in absolute terms in such circumstances would be to 'allow the time limit to impair the very essence of the statutory right of appeal'.
Davies J ruled that in the present case there was a good reason why Ms Daniels was unable to lodge the appeal on time, namely that she was unable to secure £235 in order to pay the court fee, due to her difficult financial circumstances. Davies J also took note of the fact that the time by which Ms Daniels was outside the 28 day deadline was short, and that the NMC did not suffer any particular prejudice as a result of the delay. She was satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed, and therefore granted an extension of the time to appeal.
This case provides a useful illustration of how in very limited circumstances the courts can be prepared to depart from rigid adherence to statutory provisions, in order not to undermine the essence of the right of appeal. It will be interesting to see how the courts deal with the issue in the future when confronted with different factual scenarios.