There have been three interesting decisions of the High Court in recent weeks concerning applications for extensions of interim orders. In Qureshi the High Court considered the approach where there
There have been three interesting decisions of the High Court in recent weeks concerning applications for extensions of interim orders. In Qureshi the High Court considered the approach where there was a difference in opinion between the expert evidence adduced by the parties and looked at the issue of delay in investigating. The next decision in the case of Makki looked at whether a condition should be continued for a period of time beyond the period when the investigation could reasonably have been brought to a conclusion. In Kidd the court considered how it should approach a case where the defendant had been given late notice of the application.
In GMC v Qureshi [2014] EWHC 775 (Admin)
In this case the court noted the difference in opinion between the medical evidence provided by the GMC in relation to the decision making and thought processes of the defendant and the impact on his ability to deal with routine matters, and the defendant's own expert evidence which whilst accepting of a level of cognitive impairment suggested that an interim suspension was not necessary for the protection of the public. The court noted that the GMC's evidence if accepted, established a serious potential risk to patients if the defendant were allowed to continue to work, and that the court was not required to arbitrate in relation to which medical opinion may ultimately be considered the correct diagnosis. The court did extend the interim order of suspension but, in order to enforce the expedition of matters, which had been offered by way of assurance by the GMC, the court only extended the interim order for three months.
In GMC v Makki [2014] EWHC 769 (Admin)
In this case the court was asked to extend an interim order of conditions against a doctor accused of abusing his professional relationship with a patient such that it developed into a sexual relationship. One of the conditions was that the defendant should have a chaperone present when in consultation with a female patient. A previous extension of the order had been sought in August 2013. The court extended the other conditions but was not satisfied that that the condition requiring a chaperone to be present should be extended, on the basis that it is not appropriate for an intrusive condition to be continued for a period of time beyond that which is reasonably required for an investigation to be brought to a conclusion.
In NMC v Kidd and De'filippis [2014] EWHC 847 (Admin)
These were two cases which were before the court in respect of applications brought by the NMC for extensions of interim orders of suspension. In both cases the interim order was about to expire. The court emphasised that in taking a decision about whether to extend an order, the court is not engaged in a routine tick box exercise and the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases the court does grant the extension sought does not undermine the point that the court is exercising an independent judgment. The court also stated that good practice suggested that a respondent should ordinarily receive a minimum of seven calendar days' notice of an application to extend, the point being that respondents ought to have a fair chance to be heard. The court also stated that cases are not intrinsically urgent but might artificially be made so by delay on the part of the regulator in bringing them to court, such that by the time the application is made, the order is about to expire, and that the proffering of a consent order to the respondent at the 11th hour had the potential to be unfair. The extensions were granted but the defendants were given liberty to apply to vacate or vary the order.
In GMC v Qureshi [2014] EWHC 775 (Admin)
In this case the court noted the difference in opinion between the medical evidence provided by the GMC in relation to the decision making and thought processes of the defendant and the impact on his ability to deal with routine matters, and the defendant's own expert evidence which whilst accepting of a level of cognitive impairment suggested that an interim suspension was not necessary for the protection of the public. The court noted that the GMC's evidence if accepted, established a serious potential risk to patients if the defendant were allowed to continue to work, and that the court was not required to arbitrate in relation to which medical opinion may ultimately be considered the correct diagnosis. The court did extend the interim order of suspension but, in order to enforce the expedition of matters, which had been offered by way of assurance by the GMC, the court only extended the interim order for three months.
In GMC v Makki [2014] EWHC 769 (Admin)
In this case the court was asked to extend an interim order of conditions against a doctor accused of abusing his professional relationship with a patient such that it developed into a sexual relationship. One of the conditions was that the defendant should have a chaperone present when in consultation with a female patient. A previous extension of the order had been sought in August 2013. The court extended the other conditions but was not satisfied that that the condition requiring a chaperone to be present should be extended, on the basis that it is not appropriate for an intrusive condition to be continued for a period of time beyond that which is reasonably required for an investigation to be brought to a conclusion.
In NMC v Kidd and De'filippis [2014] EWHC 847 (Admin)
These were two cases which were before the court in respect of applications brought by the NMC for extensions of interim orders of suspension. In both cases the interim order was about to expire. The court emphasised that in taking a decision about whether to extend an order, the court is not engaged in a routine tick box exercise and the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases the court does grant the extension sought does not undermine the point that the court is exercising an independent judgment. The court also stated that good practice suggested that a respondent should ordinarily receive a minimum of seven calendar days' notice of an application to extend, the point being that respondents ought to have a fair chance to be heard. The court also stated that cases are not intrinsically urgent but might artificially be made so by delay on the part of the regulator in bringing them to court, such that by the time the application is made, the order is about to expire, and that the proffering of a consent order to the respondent at the 11th hour had the potential to be unfair. The extensions were granted but the defendants were given liberty to apply to vacate or vary the order.