D v General Medical Council [2015] EWHC 847 (Admin) | Fieldfisher
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D v General Medical Council [2015] EWHC 847 (Admin)

20/04/2015
In this recent case the Court upheld an 18 month interim suspension order imposed by a GMC Panel on a doctor awaiting trial for an offence of blackmail. The suspension was made on the grounds that it In this recent case the Court upheld an 18 month interim suspension order imposed by a GMC Panel on a doctor awaiting trial for an offence of blackmail. The suspension was made on the grounds that it was necessary to maintain public confidence in the profession. The Court had considered the argument that the suspension should be lifted because the doctor had not at that time been found guilty of any offence and the matter was unrelated to his clinical practice. The court refused the application.

The claimant GP applied to terminate an interim suspension order which had been imposed after he had been charged with blackmailing a former lover. The GP had admitted his actions and had repaid the substantial amount of money that he had received from his former lover. The amount of money in question was significant – his former lover had paid him £70,000 plus further monthly payments of £1,000. The money had been paid after the GP had threatened to show sexual photographs of his former lover to the police and her fiancée if she did not resume their relationship, and had threatened to reveal their relationship at her wedding. In August 2014 the GP was charged with blackmail and it was decided that he would stand trial in June 2015. He has expressed an intention to plead not guilty.

The High Court upheld the Panel's decision to impose a suspension, stating that an application to terminate a suspension order would only be reversed if it was believed that the panel's decision was wrong or if there had been a material change of circumstances. It also held that there would be sufficient justification for a suspension if there was some implication of "necessity" and it was at the very least "desirable" in the interests of the public. Where public confidence was the primary issue for the GMC, there had to be a likelihood of "serious" damage to public confidence in the and the suspension had to be proportionate.

The Court noted that although blackmail is listed in GMC guidance as an offence that should be referred for consideration of an interim suspension, this did not mean that suspension should automatically follow. However in this case the Court agreed that the GP's conduct was serious enough for there to be restrictions on his registration whilst the allegations were unresolved. The court agreed that the GP's conduct fell far outside the spectrum of acceptable behaviour, particularly considering the extent of his threats and the demand of a substantial amount of money. It noted that blackmail is regarded as an extremely serious offence with a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. In reaching its decision, the Court considered the view that a properly informed and reasonable member of the public would take of the matter. This included making allowance for the fact that the events occurred in the context of a relationship breakdown. Even making such an allowance, the Court concluded that such a member of the public would consider that the GP's behaviour was far outside the spectrum of what was acceptable and raised serious questions about his judgment and integrity.

The court acknowledged that this was a rare case of a doctor of good character and good professional standing against whom allegations had been made that were sufficiently serious that there was a real likelihood of serious damage to public confidence if he were to be allowed to continue practising. Therefore the Panel's decision was upheld.

Although the court decided against the doctor in this case, it is evident that it considered his conduct to be at the more serious end of the spectrum of behaviours that might be seen by the GMC. The court's decision clearly indicates that for allegations unrelated to a doctor's professional practice, a relatively high threshold applies for the justification of an interim suspension on the grounds of public confidence.

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