Professional Standards Agency for Health and Social Care v General Medical Council (unreported, 22 May 2014)A psychiatrist, N, ran a website where he answered questions from readers. After a complaint
Professional Standards Agency for Health and Social Care v General Medical Council (unreported, 22 May 2014)
A psychiatrist, N, ran a website where he answered questions from readers. After a complaint by a blog user, the GMC investigated and alleged that N was guilty of misconduct and that his fitness to practise was impaired. N later added a disclaimer to his website stating that the blog should not be considered a medical or psychiatric service. A GMC fitness to practise panel found that N had failed to recommend that certain readers saw a doctor or psychiatrist or attended counselling and had failed to seek extra information to determine a diagnosis. However, the panel concluded that the blog did not constitute medical practice and therefore that his conduct did not amount to misconduct. The PSA appealed to the High Court on the basis that the decision was unduly lenient and that the panel had misdirected itself on the meaning of misconduct.
The High Court allowed the appeal. While there was an inherent sense of double jeopardy in allowing the PSA to appeal decisions made by fitness to practise panels, it did not go so far as to be unlawful (Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v General Medical Council (2004) applied). The panel's consideration of misconduct had been too narrow and the panel should have asked whether N's actions were in the exercise of professional practice such that it could properly be described as misconduct going to fitness to practise (Remedy v GMC applied). If his conduct was not in the context of clinical practice, the panel still had to consider whether it was done in the exercise of the doctor's medical calling. Non-conventional forms of practice could still be the subject of misconduct even where there was not a typical practitioner/patient relationship. The court went on to say that by performing his psychiatric practice online, N had assumed an element of responsibility; the absence of a clear statement of limitation of liability meant that N's conduct was sufficient to amount to misconduct. The court remitted the matter back to a new panel for consideration as to whether this amounted to impaired fitness to practise.
This case is a useful reminder for doctors and other practitioners who offer advice outside of their usual practice. While such blogs and guidance could be useful to the public, healthcare professionals will need to ensure that the scope of their advice and any limitations on their liability are clear and that they maintain high professional standards.
A psychiatrist, N, ran a website where he answered questions from readers. After a complaint by a blog user, the GMC investigated and alleged that N was guilty of misconduct and that his fitness to practise was impaired. N later added a disclaimer to his website stating that the blog should not be considered a medical or psychiatric service. A GMC fitness to practise panel found that N had failed to recommend that certain readers saw a doctor or psychiatrist or attended counselling and had failed to seek extra information to determine a diagnosis. However, the panel concluded that the blog did not constitute medical practice and therefore that his conduct did not amount to misconduct. The PSA appealed to the High Court on the basis that the decision was unduly lenient and that the panel had misdirected itself on the meaning of misconduct.
The High Court allowed the appeal. While there was an inherent sense of double jeopardy in allowing the PSA to appeal decisions made by fitness to practise panels, it did not go so far as to be unlawful (Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v General Medical Council (2004) applied). The panel's consideration of misconduct had been too narrow and the panel should have asked whether N's actions were in the exercise of professional practice such that it could properly be described as misconduct going to fitness to practise (Remedy v GMC applied). If his conduct was not in the context of clinical practice, the panel still had to consider whether it was done in the exercise of the doctor's medical calling. Non-conventional forms of practice could still be the subject of misconduct even where there was not a typical practitioner/patient relationship. The court went on to say that by performing his psychiatric practice online, N had assumed an element of responsibility; the absence of a clear statement of limitation of liability meant that N's conduct was sufficient to amount to misconduct. The court remitted the matter back to a new panel for consideration as to whether this amounted to impaired fitness to practise.
This case is a useful reminder for doctors and other practitioners who offer advice outside of their usual practice. While such blogs and guidance could be useful to the public, healthcare professionals will need to ensure that the scope of their advice and any limitations on their liability are clear and that they maintain high professional standards.