Adu v GMC [2014] EWHC 1946 (Admin), Warby JIn this case, a newly appointed High Court judge recused himself from hearing a disciplinary appeal in circumstances where he had until recently practised
Adu v GMC [2014] EWHC 1946 (Admin), Warby J
In this case, a newly appointed High Court judge recused himself from hearing a disciplinary appeal in circumstances where he had until recently practised from the same chambers as the Fitness to Practise Panel's Legal Assessor (against whom the registrant, on appeal, made allegations of bias).
The Appellant is a paediatrician and was accused of deficient professional performance. The allegation was upheld and the panel directed that his name be erased from the medical register. Prior to the hearing beginning, the Legal Assessor (who at that time practised from the same chambers as the judge on appeal) had disclosed to the panel and to the parties that one of his children had suffered from health problems and that he had concerns over the treatment his child received. The panel determined that there was no requirement for the Legal Assessor to recuse himself.
On appeal, the appellant contended that the Legal Assessor should have stood down and that his failure to do so led to a biased hearing. The judge advised the parties that he had practised from the same chambers with the Legal Assessor for 20 years until around 10 days prior to the appeal. Moreover, he was in the process of editing a legal textbook to which the Legal Assessor was a contributor and, to that extent, they continued to have a relationship. Counsel on behalf of the GMC submitted that, in accordance with the principles set out in the leading case of Porter v Magill [2002] 2 A.C. 357 the fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias if the judge were to hear the case.
The judge sought clarification from the appellant as to whether he was alleging apparent or actual bias against the Legal Assessor. While the precise nature of the appellant's allegation was not entirely clear, the judge concluded that he should recuse himself, highlighting the recent and ongoing nature of his relationship with the Legal Assessor and stating, 'if I had proceeded to hear and determine this appeal that would have involved me in ruling upon the propriety, or at least the apparent propriety, of the conduct as Legal Assessor of a person who is well known to me.'
While the case applies settled principles to a relatively unusual set of facts, it is an interesting illustration of the issues faced by judges who decide cases either argued by those who were formerly close associates or, as in the present case, where they must adjudicate on the conduct of those associates.
In this case, a newly appointed High Court judge recused himself from hearing a disciplinary appeal in circumstances where he had until recently practised from the same chambers as the Fitness to Practise Panel's Legal Assessor (against whom the registrant, on appeal, made allegations of bias).
The Appellant is a paediatrician and was accused of deficient professional performance. The allegation was upheld and the panel directed that his name be erased from the medical register. Prior to the hearing beginning, the Legal Assessor (who at that time practised from the same chambers as the judge on appeal) had disclosed to the panel and to the parties that one of his children had suffered from health problems and that he had concerns over the treatment his child received. The panel determined that there was no requirement for the Legal Assessor to recuse himself.
On appeal, the appellant contended that the Legal Assessor should have stood down and that his failure to do so led to a biased hearing. The judge advised the parties that he had practised from the same chambers with the Legal Assessor for 20 years until around 10 days prior to the appeal. Moreover, he was in the process of editing a legal textbook to which the Legal Assessor was a contributor and, to that extent, they continued to have a relationship. Counsel on behalf of the GMC submitted that, in accordance with the principles set out in the leading case of Porter v Magill [2002] 2 A.C. 357 the fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias if the judge were to hear the case.
The judge sought clarification from the appellant as to whether he was alleging apparent or actual bias against the Legal Assessor. While the precise nature of the appellant's allegation was not entirely clear, the judge concluded that he should recuse himself, highlighting the recent and ongoing nature of his relationship with the Legal Assessor and stating, 'if I had proceeded to hear and determine this appeal that would have involved me in ruling upon the propriety, or at least the apparent propriety, of the conduct as Legal Assessor of a person who is well known to me.'
While the case applies settled principles to a relatively unusual set of facts, it is an interesting illustration of the issues faced by judges who decide cases either argued by those who were formerly close associates or, as in the present case, where they must adjudicate on the conduct of those associates.