Killing the Internet
"This article was first published in Data Protection Law & Policy in January 2013.
The beginning of 2013 could not have been more dramatic for the future of European data protection. After months of deliberations, veiled announcements and guarded statements, the rapporteur of the European Parliament's committee responsible for taking forward the ongoing legislative reform has revealed his position loudly and clearly. Jan Albrecht's proposal is by no means the final say of the Parliament but it is an indication of where an MEP who has thought long and hard about what the new data protection law should look like stands. The reactions have been equally loud. The European Commission has calmly welcomed the proposal, whilst some Member States' governments have expressed serious concerns about its potential impact on the information economy. Amongst the stakeholders, the range of opinions vary quite considerably – Albrecht's approach is praised by regulators whilst industry leaders have massive misgivings about it. So who is right? Is this proposal the only possible way of truly protecting our personal information or have the bolts been tightened too much?
There is nothing more appropriate than a dispassionate legal analysis of some key elements of Albrecht's proposal to reveal the truth: if the current proposal were to become law today, many of the most popular and successful Internet services we use daily would become automatically unlawful. In other words, there are some provisions in Albrecht's draft proposal that when combined together would not only cripple the Internet as we know it, but they would stall one of the most promising building blocks of our economic prosperity, the management and exploitation of personal information. Sensationalist? Consider this:
- Traditionally, European data protection law has required that in order to collect and use personal data at all, one has to meet a lawful ground for processing. The European Commission had intended to carry on with this tradition but ensuring that the so-called 'legitimate interests' ground, which permits data uses that do not compromise the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, remained available. Albrecht proposes to replace this balancing exercise with a list of what qualifies as a legitimate interest and a list of what doesn't. The combination of both lists have the effect of ruling out any data uses which involve either data analytics or simply the processing of large amounts of personal data, so the obvious outcome is that the application of the 'legitimate interests' ground to common data collection activities on the Internet is no longer possible.
- Albrecht's aim of relegating reliance on the 'legitimate interests' ground to very residual cases is due to the fact that he sees individual's consent as the primary basis for all data uses. However, the manner and circumstances under which consent may be obtained are strictly limited. Consent is not valid if the recipient is in a dominant market position. Consent for the use of data is not valid either if presented as a condition of the terms of a contract and the data is not strictly necessary for the provision of the relevant service. All that means that if a service is offered for free to the consumer – like many of the most valuable things on the Internet – but the provider of that service is seeking to rely on the value of the information generated by the user to operate as a business, there will not be a lawful way for that information to be used.
- To finish things off, Albrecht delivers a killing blow through the concept of 'profiling'. Defined as automated processing aimed at analysing things like preferences and behaviour, it covers what has become the pillar of e-commerce and is set to change the commercial practices of every single consumer-facing business going forward. However, under Albrecht's proposal, such practices are automatically banned and only permissible with the consent of the individual, which as shown above, is pretty much mission impossible.
The collective effect of these provisions is truly devastating. This is not an exaggeration. It is the outcome of a simple legal analysis of a proposal deliberately aimed at restricting activities seen as a risk to people. The decision that needs to be made now is whether such a risk is real or perceived and, in any event, sufficiently great to merit curtailing the development of the most sophisticated and widely used means of communication ever invented.