A commission into the future of policing, set up by the Labour party and chaired by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens, has made a number of eye catching recommendations in its
A commission into the future of policing, set up by the Labour party and chaired by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens, has made a number of eye catching recommendations in its report published on 25 November 2013. The commission claims to be the most wide-ranging review into policing since the Royal Commission of 1962 and the commission included former heads of MI6 and Interpol. Labour has pledged to implement 'the vast majority' of the recommendations if elected in 2015. In the first of two posts on the commission, we look at one of the most eye-catching proposals of its report, namely that Police and Crime Commissioners ('PCCs') should be abolished.
PCCs
In 2011, the coalition government passed the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act which established the current system of PCCs. This replaced the old system of Police Authorities and was designed to make the police more accountable at a local level by making Chief Constables subject to oversight by directly elected PCCs. PCCs have the power to hire and fire Chief Constables and set priorities for the police (though direction and control of individual forces remains with Chief Constables). It was envisaged that the Police and Crime Commissioners themselves would be subject to strict checks and balances by virtue of the scrutiny of local Police and Crime Panels ('PCPs'). The first PCCs took up their posts in November 2012 for five-year terms.
Criticism
The commission is highly critical of how the PCC system is designed and how it has operated in practice, describing it as 'a failed experiment'. While recognising the 'important principle of democratic accountability that underpins [PCCs]', the report concludes that there is 'mounting evidence that PCCs are a flawed means of giving effect to that principle'.
The commission concludes that the problems are systemic and cites six key factors for this:
Proposals for reform
The commission has considered a number of proposals for reform, including: a stronger role for local authorities; a Policing Board comprising the leaders of each local authority within the police force area (possibly with an elected chair or, alternatively, a fully elected local Policing Board).
What next?
The commission and its conclusions beg a number of questions. First, to what extent are the problems identified systemic? It seems hard to argue that low turnout in an election and, perhaps by virtue of this, a fairly narrow demographic of those appointed as PCCs are systemic problems rather than problems of how the election process was publicised and managed. The same arguments apply to the apparent problem of invisibility. While some of the apparent problems identified (lack of power for PCPs, size of constituencies) are more related to the PCC framework as a whole, there are arguments to suggest that these could be reformed without dismantling the entire system.
Second, whether the suggested alternatives will really be an improvement. While the commission highlights apparent cronyism and instances of PCC conduct which supposedly gives rise to cause for concern, the idea that other arrangements will somehow be free from human error or frailty may be thought by some to be naïve. Notwithstanding this, the proposal for greater involvement at a local level (via the Policing Boards) is an interesting one and may address some of the concerns over visibility and local engagement. Whether or not this could, if considered desirable, be brought in as part of the PCC system is unclear.
Third, to what extent are the conclusions of the commission likely to be implemented? Former Police Minister Nick Herbert has recently written in support of PCCs, suggesting that the system has broadly been a success and that it should be rolled out to cover other emergency services. He is not alone in his opinion. There appears to be little consensus across the political spectrum that the PCC system needs to be radically overhauled. The report itself might be considered by some to be written from the point of view of those who have spent careers in law enforcement who were perhaps not the most enthusiastic cheerleaders for the new regime in the first place. Finally, the next election will not take place until 2015. Current odds appear stacked in favour of another hung parliament, with coalition likely. Whether the commission's proposals have any hope of being implemented in their current, undiluted form is very much an open question.
PCCs
In 2011, the coalition government passed the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act which established the current system of PCCs. This replaced the old system of Police Authorities and was designed to make the police more accountable at a local level by making Chief Constables subject to oversight by directly elected PCCs. PCCs have the power to hire and fire Chief Constables and set priorities for the police (though direction and control of individual forces remains with Chief Constables). It was envisaged that the Police and Crime Commissioners themselves would be subject to strict checks and balances by virtue of the scrutiny of local Police and Crime Panels ('PCPs'). The first PCCs took up their posts in November 2012 for five-year terms.
Criticism
The commission is highly critical of how the PCC system is designed and how it has operated in practice, describing it as 'a failed experiment'. While recognising the 'important principle of democratic accountability that underpins [PCCs]', the report concludes that there is 'mounting evidence that PCCs are a flawed means of giving effect to that principle'.
The commission concludes that the problems are systemic and cites six key factors for this:
- Elections/turnout. The low turnout in the November 2012 PCC elections has given rise to a 'legitimacy deficit';
- Composition. The vast majority of PCCs are male, white and middle-aged. In addition, a number of former Chief Constables have been appointed as PCCs, alongside former members of the 'discredited' system of Police Authorities, undermining arguments that the PCC system is substantially different from that which preceded it;
- Invisibility. There is little evidence to suggest that PCCs have captured the public imagination or that PCCs are engaging successfully with diverse communities across their constituencies;
- Appointment of staff. The process of PCCs appointing staff has been mired in controversy, lack of transparency and allegations of poor practice, leading to a culture of cronyism. In addition, PCPs have not been able to effectively scrutinise and temper appointments;
- Relationships between PCCs and Chief Constables. The commission highlights concerns over the power of PCCs to hire and fire Chief Constables, points to a handful of individual cases and suggests that PCPs have provided ineffective scrutiny; and
- Scope of role/size of constituency. The commission concludes that the reliance on existing police force boundaries spreads many PCCs too thinly and is particularly deficient in overlooking the issue of democratic engagement and public involvement at Local Policing Area or neighbourhood level.
Proposals for reform
The commission has considered a number of proposals for reform, including: a stronger role for local authorities; a Policing Board comprising the leaders of each local authority within the police force area (possibly with an elected chair or, alternatively, a fully elected local Policing Board).
What next?
The commission and its conclusions beg a number of questions. First, to what extent are the problems identified systemic? It seems hard to argue that low turnout in an election and, perhaps by virtue of this, a fairly narrow demographic of those appointed as PCCs are systemic problems rather than problems of how the election process was publicised and managed. The same arguments apply to the apparent problem of invisibility. While some of the apparent problems identified (lack of power for PCPs, size of constituencies) are more related to the PCC framework as a whole, there are arguments to suggest that these could be reformed without dismantling the entire system.
Second, whether the suggested alternatives will really be an improvement. While the commission highlights apparent cronyism and instances of PCC conduct which supposedly gives rise to cause for concern, the idea that other arrangements will somehow be free from human error or frailty may be thought by some to be naïve. Notwithstanding this, the proposal for greater involvement at a local level (via the Policing Boards) is an interesting one and may address some of the concerns over visibility and local engagement. Whether or not this could, if considered desirable, be brought in as part of the PCC system is unclear.
Third, to what extent are the conclusions of the commission likely to be implemented? Former Police Minister Nick Herbert has recently written in support of PCCs, suggesting that the system has broadly been a success and that it should be rolled out to cover other emergency services. He is not alone in his opinion. There appears to be little consensus across the political spectrum that the PCC system needs to be radically overhauled. The report itself might be considered by some to be written from the point of view of those who have spent careers in law enforcement who were perhaps not the most enthusiastic cheerleaders for the new regime in the first place. Finally, the next election will not take place until 2015. Current odds appear stacked in favour of another hung parliament, with coalition likely. Whether the commission's proposals have any hope of being implemented in their current, undiluted form is very much an open question.